Abstract
We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 63-79 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2000 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Asymmetric information
- Common knowledge
- Core
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty