TY - JOUR
T1 - Condorcet winners and social acceptability
AU - Mahajne, Muhammad
AU - Volij, Oscar
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank three anonymous referees for their helpful and generous comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from Université de Lyon (project INDEPTH Scientific Breakthrough Program of IDEX Lyon) within the program Investissement d’Avenir (ANR-16-IDEX-0005).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2019/12/1
Y1 - 2019/12/1
N2 - We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals who rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner may not necessarily be socially acceptable. However, if preferences are single-peaked, single-dipped, or satisfy the single-crossing property, any Condorcet winner is socially acceptable. We identify maximal families of preferences that guarantee that Condorcet winners are socially acceptable.
AB - We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals who rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner may not necessarily be socially acceptable. However, if preferences are single-peaked, single-dipped, or satisfy the single-crossing property, any Condorcet winner is socially acceptable. We identify maximal families of preferences that guarantee that Condorcet winners are socially acceptable.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85068977429&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-019-01204-7
DO - 10.1007/s00355-019-01204-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85068977429
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 53
SP - 641
EP - 653
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 4
ER -