Contests with insurance

Yizhaq Minchuk; Aner Sela

doi:10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5

Contests with insurance

Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information in which contestants have non-linear effort functions. The designer offers the option of insurance for which a contestant pays a premium to the contest designer. If a contestant does not win he is reimbursed the cost of his effort. We demonstrate that contests with insurance may be profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize his expected revenue as based on the contestants’ expected total effort, the premium of the insured contestants, and their reimbursement.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-22
Number of pages	22
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	24
Issue number	1-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5
State	Published - 1 Jun 2020

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Contests
Insurance
Reimbursement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

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10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5

Cite this

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KW - Reimbursement

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Contests with insurance

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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