TY - JOUR
T1 - Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests
AU - Einy, Ezra
AU - Moreno, Diego
AU - Sela, Aner
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - We show that the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence of a Tullock contest with incomplete information is upper semicontinuous. Further, we show that when equilibrium is unique and players’ costs of effort are either state independent or uniformly bounded, then it is also lower semicontinuous, and it is robust to small perturbations of the players’ information, value for the prize, and cost of effort, as well as of the contest success function.
AB - We show that the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence of a Tullock contest with incomplete information is upper semicontinuous. Further, we show that when equilibrium is unique and players’ costs of effort are either state independent or uniformly bounded, then it is also lower semicontinuous, and it is robust to small perturbations of the players’ information, value for the prize, and cost of effort, as well as of the contest success function.
U2 - 10.1007/s40505-020-00187-4
DO - 10.1007/s40505-020-00187-4
M3 - Article
SN - 2196-1093
VL - 8
SP - 333
EP - 345
JO - Economic Theory Bulletin
JF - Economic Theory Bulletin
IS - 2
ER -