Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria

David Wettstein

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90075-U

Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria

David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate the implementability of the Social Choice Correspondence induced by Constrained Rational Expectations Equilibria. We construct an "almost continuous" mechanism that implements it, provided that information held by each agent is non-exclusive.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	208-222
Number of pages	15
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	52
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90075-U
State	Published - 1 Jan 1990
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria

Abstract

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