Abstract
In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control - in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs - and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2624-2632 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
| Volume | 2024-May |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 2024 |
| Event | 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2024 - Auckland, New Zealand Duration: 6 May 2024 → 10 May 2024 |
Keywords
- Computational social choice
- computational complexity
- liquid democracy
- manipulation
- parameterized complexity
- proxy voting
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering
