Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules

Aaron Koolyk, Tyrone Strangway, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism that assumes all voters are strategic, and allows voters to change their stated preferences as the vote progresses until an equilibrium is reached (at which point no player wishes to change their vote). Previous research established that this process converges to an equilibrium for the plurality and veto voting methods and for no other scoring rule. We consider iterative voting for non-scoring rules, examining the major ones, and show that none of them converge when assuming (as most research has so far) that voters pursue a best response strategy. We investigate other potential voter strategies, with a more heuristic flavor (since for most of these voting rules, calculating the best response is NP-hard); we show that they also do not converge. We then conduct an empirical analysis of the iterative voting winners for these non-scoring rules, and compare the winner quality of various strategies.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
EditorsCarles Sierra
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages273-279
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241103
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017 - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: 19 Aug 201725 Aug 2017

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume0
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
Country/TerritoryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period19/08/1725/08/17

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