Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules

Aaron Koolyk, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1329-1330
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450342391
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 9 May 201613 May 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
Country/TerritorySingapore
CitySingapore
Period9/05/1613/05/16

Keywords

  • Equilibrium
  • Iterative voting
  • Social choice

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