Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics

Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

It is shown that the core of a non-atomic glove-market game which is defined as the minimum of finitely many non-atomic probability measures is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. This result is used to characterize some stable sets of large games which have a decreasing returns to scale property. We also study exact non-atomic glove-market games. In particular we show that in a glove-market game which consists of the minimum of finitely many mutually singular non-atomic measures, the core is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set iff the game is exact. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71, D24.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)200-211
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume68
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1996

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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