Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games

Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. We also extend the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set to games with a measurable space of players and show that for continuous convex games the core may be strictly included in the bargaining set but it coincides with the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the bargaining set. We provide examples which show that the continuity assumption is essential to our results.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Sep 1997

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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