Cost-optimal planning by self-interested agents

Raz Nissim, Ronen I. Brafman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

As our world becomes better connected and autonomous agents no longer appear to be science fiction, a natural need arises for enabling groups of selfish agents to cooperate in generating plans for diverse tasks that none of them can perform alone in a cost-effective manner. While most work on planning for/by selfish agents revolves around finding stable solutions (e.g., Nash Equilibrium), this work combines techniques from mechanism design with a recently introduced method for distributed planning, in order to find cost optimal (and, thus, social welfare maximizing) solutions. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, we present both a centralized, and a privacy-preserving distributed mechanism.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Pages732-738
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2013
Event27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 - Bellevue, WA, United States
Duration: 14 Jul 201318 Jul 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013

Conference

Conference27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBellevue, WA
Period14/07/1318/07/13

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