TY - GEN
T1 - Cost-optimal planning by self-interested agents
AU - Nissim, Raz
AU - Brafman, Ronen I.
PY - 2013/12/1
Y1 - 2013/12/1
N2 - As our world becomes better connected and autonomous agents no longer appear to be science fiction, a natural need arises for enabling groups of selfish agents to cooperate in generating plans for diverse tasks that none of them can perform alone in a cost-effective manner. While most work on planning for/by selfish agents revolves around finding stable solutions (e.g., Nash Equilibrium), this work combines techniques from mechanism design with a recently introduced method for distributed planning, in order to find cost optimal (and, thus, social welfare maximizing) solutions. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, we present both a centralized, and a privacy-preserving distributed mechanism.
AB - As our world becomes better connected and autonomous agents no longer appear to be science fiction, a natural need arises for enabling groups of selfish agents to cooperate in generating plans for diverse tasks that none of them can perform alone in a cost-effective manner. While most work on planning for/by selfish agents revolves around finding stable solutions (e.g., Nash Equilibrium), this work combines techniques from mechanism design with a recently introduced method for distributed planning, in order to find cost optimal (and, thus, social welfare maximizing) solutions. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, we present both a centralized, and a privacy-preserving distributed mechanism.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84893348459
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84893348459
SN - 9781577356158
T3 - Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
SP - 732
EP - 738
BT - Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
T2 - 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Y2 - 14 July 2013 through 18 July 2013
ER -