Customers’ abandonment strategy in an M / G / 1 queue

Eliran Sherzer, Yoav Kerner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider an M / G / 1 queue in which the customers, while waiting in line, may renege from it. We show the Nash equilibrium profile among customers and show that it is defined by two sequences of thresholds. For each customer, the decision is based on the observed past (which determines from what sequence the threshold is taken) and the observed queue length (which determines the appropriate element in the chosen sequence). We construct a set of equations that has the Nash equilibrium as its solution and discuss the relationships between the properties of the service time distribution and the properties of the Nash equilibrium, such as uniqueness and finiteness.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)65-87
Number of pages23
JournalQueueing Systems
Volume90
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Oct 2018

Keywords

  • Abandonment
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Queuing system

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics

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