Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism

M. Vittoria Levati, Ro'i Zultan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We define contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contribution cycles to assign a measure of conditional cooperation to each group play. The validity of the measures is tested in an experiment. We find that roughly 20% of the plays exhibit dynamics of conditional cooperation. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-15
Number of pages15
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2011
Externally publishedYes


  • Conditional cooperation
  • Information feedback
  • Public goods game
  • Real-time protocol

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Applied Mathematics


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