Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice

Ben Abramowitz, Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Any community in which membership is voluntary may eventually break apart, or fork. For example, forks may occur in political parties, business partnerships, social groups, and cryptocurrencies. Forking may be the product of informal social processes or the organized action of an aggrieved minority or an oppressive majority. The aim of this paper is to provide a social choice framework in which agents can report preferences not only over a set of alternatives, but also over the possible forks that may occur in the face of disagreement. We study the resulting social choice setting, concentrating on stability issues, preference elicitation and strategy-proofness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Decision Theory - 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Proceedings
EditorsDimitris Fotakis, David Ríos Insua
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages341-356
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)9783030877552
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2021
Event7th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2021 - Toulouse, France
Duration: 3 Nov 20215 Nov 2021

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume13023 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference7th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2021
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityToulouse
Period3/11/215/11/21

Keywords

  • Blockchain
  • Forking
  • Group activity selection

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