TY - GEN
T1 - Democratic Forking
T2 - 7th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2021
AU - Abramowitz, Ben
AU - Elkind, Edith
AU - Grossi, Davide
AU - Shapiro, Ehud
AU - Talmon, Nimrod
N1 - Funding Information:
Ehud Shapiro is the Incumbent of The Harry Weinrebe Professorial Chair of Computer Science and Biology. We thank the generous support of the Braginsky Center for the Interface between Science and the Humanities. Nimrod Talmon was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF; Grant No. 630/19). Ben Abramowitz was supported in part by NSF award CCF-1527497.
Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. Ehud Shapiro is the Incumbent of The Harry Weinrebe Professorial Chair of Computer Science and Biology. We thank the generous support of the Braginsky Center for the Interface between Science and the Humanities. Nimrod Talmon was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF; Grant No. 630/19). Ben Abramowitz was supported in part by NSF award CCF-1527497.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2021/1/1
Y1 - 2021/1/1
N2 - Any community in which membership is voluntary may eventually break apart, or fork. For example, forks may occur in political parties, business partnerships, social groups, and cryptocurrencies. Forking may be the product of informal social processes or the organized action of an aggrieved minority or an oppressive majority. The aim of this paper is to provide a social choice framework in which agents can report preferences not only over a set of alternatives, but also over the possible forks that may occur in the face of disagreement. We study the resulting social choice setting, concentrating on stability issues, preference elicitation and strategy-proofness.
AB - Any community in which membership is voluntary may eventually break apart, or fork. For example, forks may occur in political parties, business partnerships, social groups, and cryptocurrencies. Forking may be the product of informal social processes or the organized action of an aggrieved minority or an oppressive majority. The aim of this paper is to provide a social choice framework in which agents can report preferences not only over a set of alternatives, but also over the possible forks that may occur in the face of disagreement. We study the resulting social choice setting, concentrating on stability issues, preference elicitation and strategy-proofness.
KW - Blockchain
KW - Forking
KW - Group activity selection
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85118969671&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_22
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_22
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85118969671
SN - 9783030877552
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 341
EP - 356
BT - Algorithmic Decision Theory - 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Proceedings
A2 - Fotakis, Dimitris
A2 - Ríos Insua, David
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Y2 - 3 November 2021 through 5 November 2021
ER -