Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

Inés Macho-Stadler; David Pérez-Castrillo; David Wettstein

doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0207-0

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. We show that they can be constructed through the sharing of appropriately defined dividends. Furthermore, we show the flexibility of this approach by using it to generate non-symmetric values.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	177-184
Number of pages	8
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	39
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0207-0
State	Published - 1 Mar 2010

Keywords

Dividends
Games with externalities
Sharing rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/s00182-009-0207-0

Cite this

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KW - Sharing rules

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Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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