Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalities defined in Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007). This is a large family of values that includes several recent proposals. We show that they can be constructed through the sharing of appropriately defined dividends. Furthermore, we show the flexibility of this approach by using it to generate non-symmetric values.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)177-184
Number of pages8
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2010


  • Dividends
  • Games with externalities
  • Sharing rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


Dive into the research topics of 'Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this