Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

Ezra Einy; Ori Haimanko; Ram Orzach; Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00018-6

Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential and finite information. This class is characterized by the property that each bidder's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over other bidders is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	247-258
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	37
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00018-6
State	Published - 1 Jan 2002

Keywords

Common-value second-price auctions
Differential information
Dominance solvability
Information advantage
Sophisticated equilibria

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00018-6

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title = "Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information",

abstract = "We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential and finite information. This class is characterized by the property that each bidder's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over other bidders is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.",

keywords = "Common-value second-price auctions, Differential information, Dominance solvability, Information advantage, Sophisticated equilibria",

author = "Ezra Einy and Ori Haimanko and Ram Orzach and Aner Sela",

note = "Funding Information: The research of Einy and Sela was supported by the Israel Science Foundation, Grant 871, 01–31.",

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T1 - Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

AU - Einy, Ezra

AU - Haimanko, Ori

AU - Orzach, Ram

AU - Sela, Aner

N1 - Funding Information: The research of Einy and Sela was supported by the Israel Science Foundation, Grant 871, 01–31.

PY - 2002/1/1

Y1 - 2002/1/1

N2 - We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential and finite information. This class is characterized by the property that each bidder's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over other bidders is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.

AB - We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential and finite information. This class is characterized by the property that each bidder's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over other bidders is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.

KW - Common-value second-price auctions

KW - Differential information

KW - Dominance solvability

KW - Information advantage

KW - Sophisticated equilibria

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U2 - 10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00018-6

DO - 10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00018-6

M3 - Article

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VL - 37

SP - 247

EP - 258

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

IS - 3

ER -

Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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