TY - JOUR
T1 - Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
AU - Einy, Ezra
AU - Haimanko, Ori
AU - Orzach, Ram
AU - Sela, Aner
N1 - Funding Information:
The research of Einy and Sela was supported by the Israel Science Foundation, Grant 871, 01–31.
PY - 2002/1/1
Y1 - 2002/1/1
N2 - We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential and finite information. This class is characterized by the property that each bidder's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over other bidders is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.
AB - We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential and finite information. This class is characterized by the property that each bidder's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over other bidders is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.
KW - Common-value second-price auctions
KW - Differential information
KW - Dominance solvability
KW - Information advantage
KW - Sophisticated equilibria
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036332079&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00018-6
DO - 10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00018-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036332079
VL - 37
SP - 247
EP - 258
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
SN - 0304-4068
IS - 3
ER -