Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions

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9 Scopus citations


In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner's curse. When a dominant strategy exists, it is given by the conditional expectation of the common value with respect to bidder's information field; if the dominant strategy is used, other bidders cannot make a profit.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)405-419
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2002


  • common-value second-price auctions
  • differential information
  • dominant strategies
  • information superiority
  • winner's curse

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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