Abstract
In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner's curse. When a dominant strategy exists, it is given by the conditional expectation of the common value with respect to bidder's information field; if the dominant strategy is used, other bidders cannot make a profit.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 405-419 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 2002 |
Keywords
- common-value second-price auctions
- differential information
- dominant strategies
- information superiority
- winner's curse
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty