Economic efficiency requires interaction

Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

33 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient economic allocations. We view this as a formalization of Hayek's classic point of view that focuses on the information transfer advantages that markets have relative to centralized planning. We study two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In both settings we provethat non-interactive protocols require exponentially larger communication costs than interactive ones, even those that only use a modest amount of interaction.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSTOC 2014 - Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages233-242
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)9781450327107
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014 - New York, NY, United States
Duration: 31 May 20143 Jun 2014

Conference

Conference4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew York, NY
Period31/05/143/06/14

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Communication complexity
  • Matching

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

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