Economic efficiency requires interaction

Shahar Dobzinski; Noam Nisan; Sigal Oren

doi:10.1145/2591796.2591815

Economic efficiency requires interaction

Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

40 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient economic allocations. We view this as a formalization of Hayek's classic point of view that focuses on the information transfer advantages that markets have relative to centralized planning. We study two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In both settings we provethat non-interactive protocols require exponentially larger communication costs than interactive ones, even those that only use a modest amount of interaction.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	STOC 2014 - Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery
Pages	233-242
Number of pages	10
ISBN (Print)	9781450327107
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/2591796.2591815
State	Published - 1 Jan 2014
Externally published	Yes
Event	4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014 - New York, NY, United States Duration: 31 May 2014 → 3 Jun 2014

Conference

Conference	4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014
Country/Territory	United States
City	New York, NY
Period	31/05/14 → 3/06/14

Keywords

Auctions
Communication complexity
Matching

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software

Access to Document

10.1145/2591796.2591815

Cite this

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title = "Economic efficiency requires interaction",

abstract = "We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient economic allocations. We view this as a formalization of Hayek's classic point of view that focuses on the information transfer advantages that markets have relative to centralized planning. We study two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In both settings we provethat non-interactive protocols require exponentially larger communication costs than interactive ones, even those that only use a modest amount of interaction.",

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AU - Nisan, Noam

AU - Oren, Sigal

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AB - We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient economic allocations. We view this as a formalization of Hayek's classic point of view that focuses on the information transfer advantages that markets have relative to centralized planning. We study two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In both settings we provethat non-interactive protocols require exponentially larger communication costs than interactive ones, even those that only use a modest amount of interaction.

KW - Auctions

KW - Communication complexity

KW - Matching

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U2 - 10.1145/2591796.2591815

DO - 10.1145/2591796.2591815

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84904325087

SN - 9781450327107

SP - 233

EP - 242

BT - STOC 2014 - Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

PB - Association for Computing Machinery

T2 - 4th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014

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ER -

Economic efficiency requires interaction

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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Cite this