Effective heuristics for committee scoring rules

Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

7 Scopus citations


Committee scoring rules form an important class of multiwinner voting rules. As computing winning committees under such rules is generally intractable, in this paper we investigate efficient heuristics for this task. We design two novel heuristics for computing approximate results of multiwinner elections under arbitrary committee scoring rules; notably, one of these heuristics uses concepts from cooperative game theory. We then provide an experimental evaluation of our heuristics (and two others, known from the literature): we compare the scores of the committees output by our algorithms to the scores of the optimal committees, and also use the two-dimensional Euclidean domain to compare the visual representations of the outputs of our algorithms.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
PublisherAAAI press
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781577358008
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2018
Externally publishedYes
Event32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018 - New Orleans, United States
Duration: 2 Feb 20187 Feb 2018

Publication series

Name32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018


Conference32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew Orleans

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence


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