Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences

  • Jiehua Chen
  • , Christian Hatschka
  • , Sofia Simola

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for single-crossing approval preferences, winner determination of the Monroe rule is polynomial, and for both rules, winner determination mostly admits FPT algorithms with respect to the number of voters to delete to obtain single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. Our results answer some complexity questions from the literature [19, 29, 22].

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationECAI 2023 - 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, including 12th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems, PAIS 2023 - Proceedings
EditorsKobi Gal, Kobi Gal, Ann Nowe, Grzegorz J. Nalepa, Roy Fairstein, Roxana Radulescu
PublisherIOS Press BV
Pages397-404
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781643684369
DOIs
StatePublished - 28 Sep 2023
Externally publishedYes
Event26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2023 - Krakow, Poland
Duration: 30 Sep 20234 Oct 2023

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Volume372
ISSN (Print)0922-6389
ISSN (Electronic)1879-8314

Conference

Conference26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2023
Country/TerritoryPoland
CityKrakow
Period30/09/234/10/23

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence

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