Efficient boolean games equilibria: A scalable approach

Zohar Komarovsky, Vadim Levit, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

The present study focuses on a family of Boolean games whose agents' interactions are defined by a social network. The task of finding social-welfare-maximizing outcomes for such games is NP-hard. Moreover, such optimal outcomes are not necessarily stable. Therefore, our aim is to devise a procedure that finds stable outcomes with an as high as possible social welfare. To this end, we construct a quadratic-time procedure, by which any initial outcome of a game in this family can be transformed into a stable solution by the use of side payments. The resulting stable outcome is ensured to be at least as efficient as the initial outcome. Considering the fact that this procedure applies for any initial state, one may use good search heuristics to find an outcome of high social welfare, and then apply the procedure to it. This naturally leads to a scalable process that finds desirable efficient and stable solutions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1405-1406
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450342391
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2016
Event15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: 9 May 201613 May 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
Country/TerritorySingapore
CitySingapore
Period9/05/1613/05/16

Keywords

  • Boolean games
  • Efficient equilibria
  • Side payments

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