@inproceedings{8de9d6d9875746109edf846f8028ad53,
title = "Efficient Learning Equilibrium",
abstract = "We introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in non cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and deviations from a prescribed ELE become irrational after polynomial time. We prove the existence of an ELE in the perfect monitoring setting, where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium. We also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Yet, it exists in the special case of common-interest games. Finally, we extend our results to general stochastic games.",
author = "Brafman, {Ronen I.} and Moshe Tennenholtz",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} NIPS 2002: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. All rights reserved.; 15th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, NIPS 2002 ; Conference date: 09-12-2002 Through 14-12-2002",
year = "2002",
month = jan,
day = "1",
language = "English",
series = "NIPS 2002: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems",
publisher = "MIT Press Journals",
pages = "1603--1610",
editor = "Suzanna Becker and Sebastian Thrun and Klaus Obermayer",
booktitle = "NIPS 2002",
address = "United States",
}