@inproceedings{8de9d6d9875746109edf846f8028ad53,
title = "Efficient Learning Equilibrium",
abstract = "We introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in non cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and deviations from a prescribed ELE become irrational after polynomial time. We prove the existence of an ELE in the perfect monitoring setting, where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium. We also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Yet, it exists in the special case of common-interest games. Finally, we extend our results to general stochastic games.",
author = "Brafman, {Ronen I.} and Moshe Tennenholtz",
note = "Funding Information: The literature on learning in games in game theory [5] is mainly concerned with the understanding of learning procedures that if adopted by the different agents will converge at end to an equilibrium of the corresponding game. The game itself may be known; the idea is to show that simple dynamics lead to rational behavior, as prescribed by a Nash equilibrium. The learning algorithms themselves are not required to satisfy any rationality requirement; it is what they converge to, if adopted by all agents that should be in equilibrium. This is quite different from the classical perspective on learning in Artificial Intelligence, where the main motivation The second author permanent address is: Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel. This work was supported in part by Israel Science Foundation under Grant #91/02-1. The first author is partially supported by the Paul Ivanier Center for Robotics and Production Management. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} NIPS 2002: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. All rights reserved.; 15th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, NIPS 2002 ; Conference date: 09-12-2002 Through 14-12-2002",
year = "2002",
month = jan,
day = "1",
language = "English",
series = "NIPS 2002: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems",
publisher = "MIT Press Journals",
pages = "1603--1610",
editor = "Suzanna Becker and Sebastian Thrun and Klaus Obermayer",
booktitle = "NIPS 2002",
address = "United States",
}