Efficient learning equilibrium

Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in non cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and deviations from a prescribed ELE become irrational after polynomial time. We prove the existence of an ELE in the perfect monitoring setting, where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium. We also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Yet, it exists in the special case of common-interest games. Finally, we extend our results to general stochastic games.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Neural Information Processing Systems 15 - Proceedings of the 2002 Conference, NIPS 2002
PublisherNeural information processing systems foundation
ISBN (Print)0262025507, 9780262025508
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2003
Event16th Annual Neural Information Processing Systems Conference, NIPS 2002 - Vancouver, BC, Canada
Duration: 9 Dec 200214 Dec 2002

Publication series

NameAdvances in Neural Information Processing Systems
ISSN (Print)1049-5258

Conference

Conference16th Annual Neural Information Processing Systems Conference, NIPS 2002
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityVancouver, BC
Period9/12/0214/12/02

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