Effort allocations in elimination tournaments

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2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study elimination tournaments with n stages and 2n symmetric players. The players have effort budgets that decrease within the stages proportionally to the efforts allocated in the previous stages such that for each effort unit that a player allocates, he loses α (the fatigue parameter) units of effort from his budget. We show that if the fatigue parameter α is larger than [Formula presented], the players allocate their efforts equally over all the first t stages, t≤n−1. In particular, if the fatigue parameter α is larger than [Formula presented], the players allocate their efforts equally over all the first n−1 stages, and only in the final stage, they exert a lower effort.

Original languageEnglish
Article number110261
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume211
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Feb 2022

Keywords

  • Elimination tournaments
  • Knockout tournaments
  • Subgame-perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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