Elections with few voters: Candidate control can be easy

Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

30 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters (that is, we take the number of voters as a parameter). We consider both the standard scenario of adding and deleting candidates, where one asks if a given candidate can become a winner (or, in the destructive case, can be precluded from winning) by adding/deleting some candidates, and a combinatorial scenario where adding/deleting a candidate automatically means adding/deleting a whole group of candidates. Our results show that the parameterized complexity of candidate control (with the number of voters as the parameter) is much more varied than in the setting with many voters.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Pages2045-2051
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357018
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015 - Austin, United States
Duration: 25 Jan 201530 Jan 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume3

Conference

Conference29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAustin
Period25/01/1530/01/15

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