Empirical aspects of plurality election equilibria

David RM Thompson, Omer Lev, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Jeffrey S Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these agents are often able to manipulate the outcome through strategic voting. Most research on manipulation of voting methods studies (1) limited solution concepts, (2) limited preferences, or (3) scenarios with a few manipulators that have a common goal. In contrast, we study voting in plurality elections through the lens of Nash equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that any number of agents, with arbitrary different goals, could all be
manipulators. This is possible thanks to recent advances in (Bayes-)Nash equilibrium computation for large games. Although plurality has numerous pure-strategy Nash equilibria, we demonstrate how a simple equilibrium refinement— assuming that agents only deviate from truthfulness when it
will change the outcome—dramatically reduces this set. We also use symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria to investigate the case where voters are uncertain of each others’ preferences. This refinement does not completely eliminate the problem
of multiple equilibria. However, it does show that even when agents manipulate, plurality still tends to lead to good outcomes (e.g., Condorcet winners, candidates that would win if voters were truthful, outcomes with high social welfare).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS'13
EditorsIto Takayuki , Jonker Catholijn , Maria Gini, Onn Shehory
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages431-442
ISBN (Print)978-1-4503-1993-5
StatePublished - 2012
EventProceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS'13 - Saint Paul , Minesota, United States
Duration: 6 May 201310 May 2013

Conference

ConferenceProceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS'13
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityMinesota
Period6/05/1310/05/13

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