Outsourced Additive Manufacturing (AM) exposes sensitive design data to external malicious actors. Even with end-to-end encryption between the design owner and 3D-printer, side-channel attacks can be used to bypass cyber-security measures and obtain the underlying design. In this paper, we develop a method based on the power side-channel that enables accurate design reconstruction in the face of full encryption measures without any prior knowledge of the design. Our evaluation on a Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) 3D Printer has shown 99 % accuracy in reconstruction, a significant improvement on the state of the art. This approach demonstrates the futility of pure cyber-security measures applied to Additive Manufacturing.
|Name||ACM International Conference Proceeding Series|
|Conference||24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, RAID 2021|
|Period||6/10/21 → 8/10/21|
- 3D Printing
- Additive Manufacturing
- IP Theft.
- Intellectual Property Theft
- Side-Channel Attack
- Human-Computer Interaction
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition