Encryption is Futile: Reconstructing 3D-Printed Models Using the Power Side-Channel.

Jacob Gatlin, Sofia Belikovetsky, Yuval Elovici, Anthony Skjellum, Joshua Lubell, Paul Witherell, Mark Yampolskiy

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract

Outsourced Additive Manufacturing (AM) exposes sensitive design data to external malicious actors. Even with end-to-end encryption between the design owner and 3D-printer, side-channel attacks can be used to bypass cyber-security measures and obtain the underlying design. In this paper, we develop a method based on the power side-channel that enables accurate design reconstruction in the face of full encryption measures without any prior knowledge of the design. Our evaluation on a Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) 3D Printer has shown 99 % accuracy in reconstruction, a significant improvement on the state of the art. This approach demonstrates the futility of pure cyber-security measures applied to Additive Manufacturing.
Original languageEnglish
Pages135-147
Number of pages13
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021
EventRAID '21: 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses -
Duration: 6 Oct 20218 Oct 2021

Conference

ConferenceRAID '21: 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses
Period6/10/218/10/21

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Encryption is Futile: Reconstructing 3D-Printed Models Using the Power Side-Channel.'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this