@inproceedings{3e30a4b55e744078aa31c7bdad5067a9,
title = "Encryption is futile: Reconstructing 3D-printed models using the power side-channel",
abstract = "Outsourced Additive Manufacturing (AM) exposes sensitive design data to external malicious actors. Even with end-to-end encryption between the design owner and 3D-printer, side-channel attacks can be used to bypass cyber-security measures and obtain the underlying design. In this paper, we develop a method based on the power side-channel that enables accurate design reconstruction in the face of full encryption measures without any prior knowledge of the design. Our evaluation on a Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM) 3D Printer has shown 99 % accuracy in reconstruction, a significant improvement on the state of the art. This approach demonstrates the futility of pure cyber-security measures applied to Additive Manufacturing.",
keywords = "3D Printing, Additive Manufacturing, Intellectual Property Theft, IP Theft., Side-Channel Attack",
author = "Jacob Gatlin and Sofia Belikovetsky and Yuval Elovici and Anthony Skjellum and Joshua Lubell and Paul Witherell and Mark Yampolskiy",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 ACM.; 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, RAID 2021 ; Conference date: 06-10-2021 Through 08-10-2021",
year = "2021",
month = oct,
day = "6",
doi = "10.1145/3471621.3471850",
language = "English",
series = "ACM International Conference Proceeding Series",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",
pages = "135--147",
booktitle = "Proceedings of 2021 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, RAID 2021",
}