Energy efficient connectivity in ad hoc networks from user's and designer's perspective

Alex Kesselman, Dariusz Kowalski, Michael Segal

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


We consider a game that models the creation of a wireless ad hoc network, where nodes are owned by selfish agents. We study a novel cost sharing model in which agents may pay for the transmission power of the other nodes. Each agent has to satisfy some connectivity requirement in the final network and the goal is to minimize its payment with no regard to the overall system performance. We analyze two fundamental connectivity games, namely broadcast and convergecast. We study pure Nash equilibria and quantify the degradation in the network performance called the price of anarchy resulting from selfish behavior. We derive asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy for these games. We also study centralized network design. One of the most important problems in wireless ad hoc networks is the minimum-energy broadcast. Recently, there appeared many new applications such as real-time multimedia, battlefield communications and rescue operations that impose stringent end-to-end latency requirement on the broadcasting time. However, the existing algorithms that minimize the broadcasting energy tend to produce solutions with high latency. In this paper we consider the problem of bounded-hop broadcast. We present approximation algorithms for this problem.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3161-3165
Number of pages5
JournalConference Record - International Conference on Communications
StatePublished - 13 Sep 2005
Event2005 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2005 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 16 May 200520 May 2005

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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