Abstract
Aumann and Brandenburger [Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180.] provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that their result can be generalized to the case where players' preferences over uncertain outcomes belong to a large class of non-expected utility preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 391-406 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 70 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 1996 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics