Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence

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Aumann and Brandenburger [Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180.] provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that their result can be generalized to the case where players' preferences over uncertain outcomes belong to a large class of non-expected utility preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)391-406
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1996
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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