TY - JOUR
T1 - Epistemology of a believing historian
T2 - Making sense of Duhem's anti-atomism
AU - Coko, Klodian
N1 - Funding Information:
I am very grateful to Theodore Arabatzis, Domenico Bertoloni Meli, Jordi Cat, Martin Patrick McNeela, Jutta Schickore and an anonymous referee for reading earlier drafts of this article and their helpful comments and suggestions. Part of the research for this paper was done while I was receiving graduate student fellowship from the Foundation for Education and European Culture (IPEP) .
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd.
PY - 2015/1/1
Y1 - 2015/1/1
N2 - Pierre Duhem's (1861-1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter has been traditionally attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, this traditional view position has been challenged by the claim that Duhem's opposition to atomism was due to the precarious state of atomic theories during the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper I present some of the difficulties with both the traditional and the new interpretation of Duhem's opposition to atomism and provide a new framework in which to understand his rejection of atomic hypotheses. I argue that although not positivist, instrumentalist, or conventionalist, Duhem's philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules. The key for understanding Duhem's resistance to atomism during the final phase of his career is the historicist arguments he presented in support of his ideal of physics.
AB - Pierre Duhem's (1861-1916) lifelong opposition to 19th century atomic theories of matter has been traditionally attributed to his conventionalist and/or positivist philosophy of science. Relatively recently, this traditional view position has been challenged by the claim that Duhem's opposition to atomism was due to the precarious state of atomic theories during the beginning of the 20th century. In this paper I present some of the difficulties with both the traditional and the new interpretation of Duhem's opposition to atomism and provide a new framework in which to understand his rejection of atomic hypotheses. I argue that although not positivist, instrumentalist, or conventionalist, Duhem's philosophy of physics was not compatible with belief in unobservable atoms and molecules. The key for understanding Duhem's resistance to atomism during the final phase of his career is the historicist arguments he presented in support of his ideal of physics.
KW - Atomism
KW - Historicism
KW - Natural classification
KW - Pierre Duhem
KW - Realism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84932630498&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.004
DO - 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.004
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84932630498
VL - 50
SP - 71
EP - 82
JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
SN - 0039-3681
IS - 1
ER -