Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential

Ezra Einy; Ori Haimanko

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.009

Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We establish existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games that have a continuous and concave potential at all states of nature, without assuming absolute continuity of information. As an application, we show that Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in many well-known games that have semi-quadratic payoffs (including Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with linear demand), for general information structures.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	288-294
Number of pages	7
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	123
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.009
State	Published - 1 Sep 2020

Keywords

Absolute continuity
Bayesian games
Bayesian potential
Concave payoffs
Equilibrium existence
Information structures

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.009

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abstract = "We establish existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games that have a continuous and concave potential at all states of nature, without assuming absolute continuity of information. As an application, we show that Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in many well-known games that have semi-quadratic payoffs (including Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with linear demand), for general information structures.",

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AB - We establish existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games that have a continuous and concave potential at all states of nature, without assuming absolute continuity of information. As an application, we show that Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in many well-known games that have semi-quadratic payoffs (including Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with linear demand), for general information structures.

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KW - Bayesian games

KW - Bayesian potential

KW - Concave payoffs

KW - Equilibrium existence

KW - Information structures

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Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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