Abstract
An econometric model of the market for tomatoes in Israel is developed to take into account the distortions brought about by the marketing board and intermediaries. The existence of monopoly and monopsony power is hypothesized by analyzing the middlemen’s optimal behavior. Being compelled by the marketing board to purchase all produce, wholesalers exert monopsony power by reducing quantities marketed to consumers by selling surpluses to the marketing board at the minimum price. The empirical results confirm the existence of strong monopsony power together with weak monopoly power in that market.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 573-582 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | American Journal of Agricultural Economics |
Volume | 67 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 1985 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Marketing boards
- Minimum price
- Monopoly power
- Monopsony power
- Price policy
- Tomatoes
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics