Estimating the market for tomatoes

Rafi Melnick, Haim Shalit

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

An econometric model of the market for tomatoes in Israel is developed to take into account the distortions brought about by the marketing board and intermediaries. The existence of monopoly and monopsony power is hypothesized by analyzing the middlemen’s optimal behavior. Being compelled by the marketing board to purchase all produce, wholesalers exert monopsony power by reducing quantities marketed to consumers by selling surpluses to the marketing board at the minimum price. The empirical results confirm the existence of strong monopsony power together with weak monopoly power in that market.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)573-582
Number of pages10
JournalAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics
Volume67
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1985
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Marketing boards
  • Minimum price
  • Monopoly power
  • Monopsony power
  • Price policy
  • Tomatoes

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