Abstract
An identity theory of truth takes a proposition to be true if and only if it is identical with a fact. Although facts are constituted by senses they are still, according to McDowell, occupants of the world. This is possible, simply because the world is a whole of conceptual contents. The crunch of my reply to Dodd, in his terms, is that to admit that there is no gap between thought and the world, is to admit that there is no ontological gap between thought and the world.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 54-57 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Annals of Spiru Haret University, Journalism Studies |
| Volume | 9 |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 2008 |
Keywords
- Facts (Philosophy)
- Truth
- Proposition (Logic)
- Identity (Philosophical concept)
- Ontology
- McDowell, John
- Dodd, Julian
- facts
- identity
- proposition
- truth
- world