Fairness in bargaining

Yoella Bereby-Meyer; Muriel Niederle

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.013

Fairness in bargaining

Yoella Bereby-Meyer
, Muriel Niederle

School of Education

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

42 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist of a proposer who offers an allocation of $10 between two players, either himself and the responder or the responder and a third party. In each case, the responder either accepts or rejects this allocation. In case of a rejection, the player who was not part of the initial division (the third party and the proposer, respectively) receives a rejection payoff (of $0, $5 or $10, depending on the game). Our results cast some doubt on existing fairness theories.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	173-186
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	56
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.013
State	Published - 1 Feb 2005

Keywords

Bargaining
Fairness
Ultimatum game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.013

Cite this

@article{b84d25591a3d4e8e86f08e5c84e8dc94,

title = "Fairness in bargaining",

abstract = "We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist of a proposer who offers an allocation of \$10 between two players, either himself and the responder or the responder and a third party. In each case, the responder either accepts or rejects this allocation. In case of a rejection, the player who was not part of the initial division (the third party and the proposer, respectively) receives a rejection payoff (of \$0, \$5 or \$10, depending on the game). Our results cast some doubt on existing fairness theories.",

keywords = "Bargaining, Fairness, Ultimatum game",

author = "Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Muriel Niederle",

year = "2005",

month = feb,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.013",

language = "English",

volume = "56",

pages = "173--186",

journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization",

issn = "0167-2681",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fairness in bargaining

AU - Bereby-Meyer, Yoella

AU - Niederle, Muriel

PY - 2005/2/1

Y1 - 2005/2/1

N2 - We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist of a proposer who offers an allocation of $10 between two players, either himself and the responder or the responder and a third party. In each case, the responder either accepts or rejects this allocation. In case of a rejection, the player who was not part of the initial division (the third party and the proposer, respectively) receives a rejection payoff (of $0, $5 or $10, depending on the game). Our results cast some doubt on existing fairness theories.

AB - We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist of a proposer who offers an allocation of $10 between two players, either himself and the responder or the responder and a third party. In each case, the responder either accepts or rejects this allocation. In case of a rejection, the player who was not part of the initial division (the third party and the proposer, respectively) receives a rejection payoff (of $0, $5 or $10, depending on the game). Our results cast some doubt on existing fairness theories.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Fairness

KW - Ultimatum game

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/10944244773

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.013

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.013

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:10944244773

SN - 0167-2681

VL - 56

SP - 173

EP - 186

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

IS - 2

ER -

Fairness in bargaining

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this