Farsighted voting dynamics

Iterative voting has presented, in the past few years, a voting model
in which a player is presented with an election poll, and changes their vote to
influence the result immediately. Several extensions have been presented for this
model, including some attempts to handle the uncertainty facing the players, but
all of them retained the myopic assumption – players change their vote only when they believe they might be changing the outcome by their move.
This paper tackles this assumption by bounding the farsightedness of the players.
Players will change their vote if they believe that if a certain number of other
voters will change as well, the outcome might change. We show that players with
the same farsightedness will converge to a Nash equilibrium with plurality, and
with veto, even players with varying farsightedness degree will always converge.
However, we show farsightedness is not necessarily a positive feature — in several cases it is better for the player to be myopic