Fault-tolerant hotelling games

Chen Avin, Avi Cohen, Zvi Lotker, David Peleg

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    Abstract

    The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies fault-tolerant versions of the Hotelling game. Two fault models are studied. The first assumes that the environment is prone to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on the line, splitting it into two separate segments and modifying each player’s Voronoi cell accordingly. A complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this variant is provided for every n. Additionally, a one-to-one correspondence is shown between equilibria of this variant and of the Hotelling game with no faults. The second fault model assumes the players are prone to failure: each player is removed from the game with i.i.d. probability, changing the payoffs of the remaining players accordingly. It is shown that for n ≥ 3 this variant of the game has no Nash equilibria.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationEAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing
    PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
    Pages133-142
    Number of pages10
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1 Jan 2019

    Publication series

    NameEAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing
    ISSN (Print)2522-8595
    ISSN (Electronic)2522-8609

    Keywords

    • Hotelling Game
    • Inside Service
    • Nash Equilibrium
    • Peripheral Services
    • Voronoi Cell

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Information Systems
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
    • Health Informatics

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