Feasible and continuous implementation

Andrew Postlewaite, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

60 Scopus citations

Abstract

There has been a great deal of research in recent years investigating the question of whether or not there exist institutions (game forms) for which the set of equilibria will coincide with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper we show the existence of a game form that is feasible, both for equilibrium and disequilibrium strategies, continuous, and for which the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of (constrained) Walrasian equilibria for all pure exchange economies. The game form allows agents to behave strategically both with respect to their preferences and their initial endowments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)603-611
Number of pages9
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Volume56
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1989
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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