Feasible and continuous implementation

Andrew Postlewaite; David Wettstein

doi:10.2307/2297503

Feasible and continuous implementation

Andrew Postlewaite, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

61 Scopus citations

Abstract

There has been a great deal of research in recent years investigating the question of whether or not there exist institutions (game forms) for which the set of equilibria will coincide with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper we show the existence of a game form that is feasible, both for equilibrium and disequilibrium strategies, continuous, and for which the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of (constrained) Walrasian equilibria for all pure exchange economies. The game form allows agents to behave strategically both with respect to their preferences and their initial endowments.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	603-611
Number of pages	9
Journal	Review of Economic Studies
Volume	56
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2307/2297503
State	Published - 1 Jan 1989
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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author = "Andrew Postlewaite and David Wettstein",

note = "Funding Information: Acknowledgement. We would like to thank David Schmeidler and two referees for comments. We would also like to thank John Moore for suggesting extensions to a previous version. This research was partially supported by NSF Grant #SES-8026086. Some of the work was done while Postlewaite visited Tel Aviv University. Some ofthis research was carried out when Wettstein was a graduate student at The University of Minnesota and a Lecturer at Tel-Aviv University.",

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Feasible and continuous implementation

Abstract

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