Fictitious play in coordination games

Aner Sela, Dorothea Herreiner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations


We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinate (almost surely) against their own type as well as against players with bounded recall. In particular, this implies that a FP player's realized average utility is (almost surely) at least as large as his minmax payoff in 2 × 2 coordination games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)189-197
Number of pages9
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1999


  • (Pure) coordination games
  • Fictitious play
  • Learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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