Fictitious play in 'one-against-all' multi-player games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

A compound game is an (n + 1 ) player game based on n two-person subgames. In each of these subgames player 0 plays against one of the other players. Player 0 is regulated, so that he must choose the same strategy in all n subgames. We show that every fictitious play process approaches the set of equilibria in compound games for which all subgames are either zero-sum games, potential games, or 2 × 2 games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)635-651
Number of pages17
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume14
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1999

Keywords

  • Fictitious play
  • Learning
  • Potential games
  • Zero-sum games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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