Abstract
A compound game is an (n + 1 ) player game based on n two-person subgames. In each of these subgames player 0 plays against one of the other players. Player 0 is regulated, so that he must choose the same strategy in all n subgames. We show that every fictitious play process approaches the set of equilibria in compound games for which all subgames are either zero-sum games, potential games, or 2 × 2 games.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 635-651 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Economic Theory |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 1999 |
Keywords
- Fictitious play
- Learning
- Potential games
- Zero-sum games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics