Forming efficient networks

David Pérez-Castrillo; David Wettstein

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.005

Forming efficient networks

David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	83-87
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	87
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.005
State	Published - 1 Apr 2005

Keywords

Implementation
Networks
Shapley value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.005

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title = "Forming efficient networks",

abstract = "We suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.",

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JF - Economics Letters

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Forming efficient networks

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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