Game authority for robust and scalable distributed selfish-computer systems

Shlomi Dolev, Elad M. Schiller, Paul G. Spirakis, Philippas Tsigas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to non-cooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2459-2466
Number of pages8
JournalTheoretical Computer Science
Issue number26-28
StatePublished - 6 Jun 2010


  • Distributed computing
  • Game authority
  • Game theory
  • Self-stabilization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science (all)


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