Abstract
Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to non-cooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 2459-2466 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Theoretical Computer Science |
Volume | 411 |
Issue number | 26-28 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 6 Jun 2010 |
Keywords
- Distributed computing
- Game authority
- Game theory
- Self-stabilization
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- General Computer Science