Abstract
In December 2003, Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, announced that Israel would withdraw unilaterally from Gaza and dismantle all of Israel's settlements there. Sharon's disengagement plan was heralded at the time as a defining moment in Israeli-Palestinian relations-a measure that would serve as a catalyst for change and revive the moribund peace process. Yet within months of Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, completed in August 2005, the optimism generated by this move had evaporated, leading to further hardship and despair for the Palestinians in Gaza and to a marked deterioration in security for Israel. This chapter assesses the reasons for the failure of the disengagement plan. It asks whether Gaza disengagement plan was yet another missed opportunity for peace.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Exit Strategies and State Building |
| Editors | Richard Caplan |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 224–241 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780199949991 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199760114 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 2012 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Ariel Sharon
- Disengagement
- Gaza
- Israel
- Settlements
- Unilateral withdrawal
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Social Sciences