Gehrlein stability in committee selection: Parameterized hardness and algorithms

Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Sanjukta Roy, Saket Saurabh, Meirav Zehavi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a multiwinner election based on the Condorcet criterion, we are given a set of candidates, and a set of voters with strict preference ranking over the candidates. A committee is weakly Gehrlein stable (WGS) if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by at least half of the voters. Recently, Aziz et al. [IJCAI 2017] studied the computational complexity of finding a WGS committee of size k. They show that this problem is NP-hard in general and and polynomial time solvable when the number of voters is odd. In this article, we initiate a systematic study of the problem in the realm of parameterized complexity. We first show that the problem is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the size of the committee. To overcome this intractability result, we use a known reformulation of WGS as a problem on directed graphs and then use parameters that measure the "structure" of these directed graphs. In particular, we consider the majority graph, defined as follows: there is a vertex corresponding to each candidate, and there is a directed arc from a candidate c to c' if the number of voters that prefer c over c' is more than those that prefer c' over c. The problem of finding WGS committee of size k corresponds to finding a vertex subset X of size k in the majority graph with the following property: the set X contains no vertex outside the committee that has an in-neighbor in X. Observe that the polynomial time algorithm of Aziz et al. [IJCAI 2017] corresponds to solving the problem on a tournament (a complete graph with orientation on edges). Thus, natural parameters to study our problem are "closeness" to being a tournament. We define closeness as the number of missing arcs in the given directed graph and the number of vertices we need to delete from the given directed graph such that the resulting graph is a tournament. We show that the problem is fixed parameter tractable (FPT) and admits linear kernels with respect to closeness parameters. Finally, we also design an exact exponential time algorithm running in time 0(1.2207nn0(1) Here, n denotes the number of candidates.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages511-519
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781510892002
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2019
Event18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 13 May 201917 May 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume1
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period13/05/1917/05/19

Keywords

  • Committee selection
  • Parameterized complexity
  • Social choice

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