TY - GEN
T1 - GRECS
T2 - 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015
AU - Meng, Xianrui
AU - Kamara, Seny
AU - Nissim, Kobbi
AU - Kollios, George
N1 - Funding Information:
George Kollios and Xianrui Meng were partially supported by NSF grants IIS-1320542 and CNS-1414119. Kobbi Nissim was supported by NSF grant CNS-1237235, a Simons Investigator grant, and ISF grant 276/12. The first author would like to thank Edith Cohen for clarifying the implementation of the all-distance sketches. The authors would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.
PY - 2015/10/12
Y1 - 2015/10/12
N2 - We propose graph encryption schemes that efficiently support approximate shortest distance queries on large-scale encrypted graphs. Shortest distance queries are one of the most fundamental graph operations and have a wide range of applications. Using such graph encryption schemes, a client can outsource large-scale privacy-sensitive graphs to an untrusted server without losing the ability to query it. Other applications include encrypted graph databases and controlled disclosure systems. We propose GRECS (stands for GRaph EnCryption for approximate Shortest distance queries) which includes three oracle encryption schemes that are provably secure against any semi-honest server. Our first construction makes use of only symmetric-key operations, resulting in a computationally-efficient construction. Our second scheme makes use of somewhat-homomorphic encryption and is less computationally-efficient but achieves optimal communication complexity (i.e. uses a minimal amount of bandwidth). Finally, our third scheme is both computationally-efficient and achieves optimal communication complexity at the cost of a small amount of additional leakage. We implemented and evaluated the efficiency of our constructions experimentally. The experiments demonstrate that our schemes are efficient and can be applied to graphs that scale up to 1:6 million nodes and 11 million edges.
AB - We propose graph encryption schemes that efficiently support approximate shortest distance queries on large-scale encrypted graphs. Shortest distance queries are one of the most fundamental graph operations and have a wide range of applications. Using such graph encryption schemes, a client can outsource large-scale privacy-sensitive graphs to an untrusted server without losing the ability to query it. Other applications include encrypted graph databases and controlled disclosure systems. We propose GRECS (stands for GRaph EnCryption for approximate Shortest distance queries) which includes three oracle encryption schemes that are provably secure against any semi-honest server. Our first construction makes use of only symmetric-key operations, resulting in a computationally-efficient construction. Our second scheme makes use of somewhat-homomorphic encryption and is less computationally-efficient but achieves optimal communication complexity (i.e. uses a minimal amount of bandwidth). Finally, our third scheme is both computationally-efficient and achieves optimal communication complexity at the cost of a small amount of additional leakage. We implemented and evaluated the efficiency of our constructions experimentally. The experiments demonstrate that our schemes are efficient and can be applied to graphs that scale up to 1:6 million nodes and 11 million edges.
KW - Graph algorithms
KW - Graph encryption
KW - Searchable encryption
KW - Shortest distance queries
KW - Structured encryption
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84954165742&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2810103.2813672
DO - 10.1145/2810103.2813672
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84954165742
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 504
EP - 517
BT - CCS 2015 - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 12 October 2015 through 16 October 2015
ER -