Homogeneous interference game in wireless networks

Joseph Naor, Danny Raz, Gabriel Scalosub

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the problem of joint usage of a shared wireless channel in a an interference-bound environment, and focus on a distributed setting where there is no central entity managing the various transmissions. In such systems, unlike other multiple access environments, several transmissions may succeed simultaneously, depending on spatial interferences between the different stations. We use a game theoretic view to model the problem, where the stations are selfish agents aiming at maximizing their success probability. We show that when interferences are homogeneous, system performance suffers an exponential degradation in performance at an equilibrium, due to the selfishness of the stations. However, when using a proper penalization scheme for aggressive stations, we can ensure the system's performance value is at least 1/e of the optimal value, while still being at equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 4th International Workshop, WINE 2008, Proceedings
Pages514-521
Number of pages8
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2008
Externally publishedYes
Event4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008 - Shanghai, China
Duration: 17 Dec 200820 Dec 2008

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5385 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008
Country/TerritoryChina
CityShanghai
Period17/12/0820/12/08

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Homogeneous interference game in wireless networks'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this