Hotelling games in fault-prone settings

Chen Avin, Avi Cohen, Zvi Lotker, David Peleg

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies the Hotelling game in fault-prone settings. Two fault models are studied: line faults and player faults. The first model assumes that the environment is prone to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on the line, splitting it into two separate segments and modifying each player's Voronoi cell accordingly. A complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this variant is provided for every n. Additionally, a one to one correspondence is shown between equilibria of this variant and of the Hotelling game with no faults. The second fault model assumes the players are prone to failure: each player is removed from the game with some probability, changing the payoffs of the remaining players accordingly. It is shown that for n≥3 this variant of the game has no Nash equilibria.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)96-107
    Number of pages12
    JournalTheoretical Computer Science
    Volume922
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 24 Jun 2022

    Keywords

    • Competitive location problems
    • Fault-prone settings
    • Hotelling game

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Theoretical Computer Science
    • General Computer Science

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